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1. Introduction 
 
In the wake of the mechanistic and materialistic conception of reality, 
in the last decades, a vision has gained momentum which considers 
man not for that which makes him different from other animals, as it 
happened for millennia, but for that which assimilates him to them. 
Sciences of mind, in particular, propose not only assimilating man 
to the animal, but, in some cases, even to automata. These sciences are 
pervaded by a form of reductionism such that the more complexes 
processes, as thought and consciousness, are reduced to simple com-
putational operations, well simulated by an automaton with finite 
states, as a Turing machine. 
We think that this new conception of man is bringing about chang-
es at the cultural level of an extreme interest; changes whose conse-
quences we think have not yet been fully appreciated. The present ar-
ticle aims to reflect on the theoretical premises underlying the new 
paradigm, so that even its possible further implications at the anthro-
pological level can be made more explicit.  
 
2. Naturalisation of mind 
 
The term «naturalism», as it is well known, points to a conception re-
lying on the assumption that nothing exists apart from nature. There-
fore, the man too must be interpreted as a natural being, by using the 
same concepts pertaining to empirical and experimental sciences.  
Naturalism however covers theories that can be more or less radi-
cal
1
. Ontological naturalism can be considered as the most radical 
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theory, since, according to it, reality is constituted only by those ob-
jects that can be investigated by physics. Thus, ontological naturalism 
and physicalism tend to coincide, and we can speak of physicalist nat-
uralism.  
 On the contrary, epistemic naturalism does not commit itself to a 
metaphysical point of view, that is it does not claim to establish what 
the authentic reality is and what the entities are that constitute it, but 
contents itself affirming that the only form of knowledge is the one 
provided by natural sciences and, in particular, physics. 
Some authors
2
, however, prefer to use the term scientific natural-
ism or liberalised naturalism, where with the former they refer to the 
conception of those who tend to reject all entities and properties that 
escape naturalisation
3
, whereas with the latter they refer to the concep-
tion according to which the realm of what is naturalistically acceptable 
is wider than the subject matter of natural sciences
4
. 
A constant claim, however, is the rejection of any form of «super-
naturalism», so that the true problem becomes that of defining the cat-
egory of «natural», and, more specifically, whether this should include 
only what is the subject matter of natural sciences
5
. In this article, we 
will concentrate on the more radical form of naturalism, which culmi-
nates in an extreme reductionism and in a conception that is indicated 
as «naturalistic monism». 
The naturalistic programme has been applied first of all to episte-
mology and Quine
6
 has proposed to consider the theory of knowledge 
as a chapter of psychology, taking it out from philosophy. It is worth 
pointing out that when Quine proposes his programme, he is confront-
ing the behaviourist model. 
Yet the following cognitivist revolution does not weaken his posi-
tion but strengthens it. Indeed, this revolution is based primarily on a 
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very important paradigm shift that occurs in physics, where infor-
mation theory introduces a breath of fresh air. The concept of infor-
mation becomes a fundamental element to explain mind and its func-
tioning, for not only is information what physical systems exchange, 
but also what human minds exchange. 
In fact, if behaviourists had simply denied the mind, or its rele-
vance in the scientific domain, cognitivists, instead, consider the re-
sponse to a stimulus as a function also of hidden variables, that is of 
internal processes, which are not directly observable: cognitive pro-
cesses which consist precisely in processing information. After exiting 
from the frontdoor, mind comes back through the backdoor, for now it 
is no longer held that only that which is observable is scientific, but 
also that which is computable, since it can be reproduced thanks to a 
computer, thus because it can be simulated.  
The programme of naturalisation of epistemology, on the one hand, 
takes advantage of the cognitivist revolution; on the other hand, it 
provides a substantial impulse to another naturalistic programme:  that 
directed to the naturalisation of mind, i.e. reducing the mind to a set of 
processes that are comparable to natural processes, for they can be de-
scribed in causal terms.  
In the case in which the mind is reduced to mechanical cognitive 
processes we have the functionalist reductionism; if reduced to biolog-
ical processes, since mental states are reduced to brain states, we have 
the materialistic reductionism, whose extreme position is materialistic 
monism. It is precisely the latter that we will be further investigating 
in the next section, because our aim is to indicate some of its theoreti-
cal presuppositions and discuss them. 
  
3. Materialistic Monism 
 
Materialistic monism represents one of the most radical consequences 
of the naturalistic conception. Ritchie resumes this perspective in 
these terms:  
 
Is there a description of how the world is in very general terms that 
should be endorsed by a naturalist? For many naturalists the answer to 
this question is straightforward. Naturalism is synonymous with an-
other “–ism” – physicalism. Physicalism is the naturalistic successor 
to the materialism of Democritus and Hobbes. Physicalists have 
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learned from science that there is more to the world than the atoms 
and the void. There are fields and forces and superpositions of state 
too. Good naturalists as they are, physicalists let scientists fill in the 
details concerning exactly what there is.
7
  
 
The reductionist consequence in that which concerns the analysis of 
human mind is the following:  
 
Higher levels represent a new and greater degree of complexity. Entities at 
one level are exhaustively composed of entities at the lower level. For exam-
ple, cells are composed of macromolecules, macromolecules are composed of 
atoms, atoms are composed of quarks, etc. The laws that govern each of these 
entities can be explained in terms of the laws of some more fundamental lev-
el. […] We then argue inductively that eventually all the various levels will 
be reductively related to one another and ultimately to fundamental physics, 
and hence that everything is physical.
8
 
  
For the most radical and reductionist form of naturalism, examining 
knowledge means nothing else than investigating the brain activity 
devoted to knowing. The very same psychological activity of empiri-
cal and experimental type is considered only as a premise of that 
which will be the neurobiological activity, and, finally, of the physical 
investigation, which constitutes for the naturalist the true science of 
that which, with some approximation, can be defined as «mental».  
This is the reason why classical or symbolic cognitivism has been 
strongly criticised, since it based the mind-computer analogy on the 
duality of hardware (the brain, in the case of biological or natural in-
telligence; the electronic substratum, in the case of artificial intelli-
gence) and software (the set of programmes that can implement both 
the biological and the electronic hardware). 
Dualism is criticised in each of its forms, precisely because it 
clashes with the naturalist programme, which, in its most extreme ver-
sion, reduces the subject matter of its investigation to the physical re-
ality, the only one that truly exists. Thinking mind as a substance, a 
«thinking substance» as Descartes would have said, and contrasting it 
with the body substance, i.e., matter, is a mistake which is unaccepta-
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ble, as Damasio
9
 explicitly affirms. This claim is echoed by Dennett, 
who referring to Ryle
10
 says:  
 
Ever since Gilbert Ryle's classic attack (1949) on what he called Descartes's 
"dogma of the ghost in the machine," dualists have been on the defensive. 
The prevailing wisdom, variously expressed and argued for, is materialism: 
there is only one sort of stuff, namely matter — the physical stuff of physics, 
chemistry, and physiology — and the mind is somehow nothing but a physi-
cal phenomenon. In short, the mind is the brain
11
. 
 
According to the supporters of materialistic monism, dualism cannot 
explain the interaction occurring between mind and body: if mind is 
not considered as constituted by physical states, how can it influence 
the brain? And Dennett goes on: «How can mind stuff both elude all 
physical measurement and control the body? »
12
.  
Radical naturalisation of mind culminates in an ontological mon-
ism, since it implies three fundamental claims: mental phenomena, in-
cluding consciousness and intentionality, are natural phenomena; 
these phenomena can be described and explained only by means of 
empirical investigations, which are based on the principle of causality; 
any form of  interaction dualism is wrong, for it violates the principle 
of closure of the physical world, according to which no physical event 
can count among its causes an event which is not itself a physical one. 
Even among supporters of qualia, i.e., those experiences that are 
made in first person (as perceiving the perfume of a rose, or the blue 
colour of the sky) many converted to materialistic monism. Searle
13
, 
who defended the reality of consciousness against Dennett, referred to 
a monism of substance and dualism of proprieties, according to which 
matter is the only really existing substance, even though it presents it-
self in two distinct properties, one of which consists in manifesting 
states of consciousness.  
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We want to draw the reader’s attention to this point: materialistic 
monism has coincided with the recovering of metaphysical realism
14
, 
in its most naïve form. This occurred even to someone who, like Den-
nett, has been able to grasp this naivety:  
 
We naïvely view almost all the features experienced as objective properties 
of the external things, observed "directly" by us […]. Our sense organs are 
bombarded with physical energy in various forms, where it is "transduced" at 
the point of contact into nerve impulses that then travel inward to the brain. 
Nothing but information passes from outside to inside, and while the receipt 
of information might provoke the creation of some phenomenological item 
(to speak as neutrally as possible), it is hard to believe that the information it-
self — which is just an abstraction made concrete in some modulated physi-
cal medium — could be the phenomenological item15. 
 
Is it possible to forget, thus, that the object we experience is not objec-
tive reality in se, but the phenomenal reality, i.e. the one modelled by 
our way of receiving stimuli and processing information which is con-
tained in them? We will come back to this crucial point. Here we 
wanted to highlight not only that the above-mentioned naivety is un-
consciously removed but, more radically, that neurosciences tend to 
put so much weight on brain states that in some cases they end up 
considering mental states nothing but brain states.  
Indeed, for some decades, consciousness has been reduced to a set 
of biological processes and, when it undervalues the «principle of 
consciousness», it ends up inevitably undervaluing also the «principle 
of responsibility». In their introduction to a recent work, De Caro, 
Lavazza and Sartori write:  
 
Results of Libet’s experiments […] seem to indicate […] that our acts […] 
are caused by a pre-conscient activity of our brain, which enters individual’s 
consciousness only subsequently […]. From this many deduce that our vol-
untary behaviour does not originate from conscious intentions, because the 
latter chronologically follow brain activity
16
. 
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These new conceptions cannot but give rise to a new anthropology, for 
man is no longer considered as that being who is characterised by his 
thinking and for having a consciousness, but for his instincts, its im-
pulses, and, especially, his unconscious processes, be they cognitive 
or biological, that end up assimilating him to an automaton.  
The consequences of this reform of anthropology are dramatic. As 
an example, it suffices to think to the consequences at the legal and 
judicial level: if human actions are essentially the by-product of un-
conscious processes, then does it still make sense to speak of civil or 
criminal responsibility of individuals? In conclusion, we can question 
whether it still makes sense « to punish individuals who could not act 
differently from how they have in fact acted, since they are genetically 
and neurophysiologically determined»
17
 . 
Patricia S. Churchland – to mention one of the most important fig-
ures of this new conception – goes as far as to identify the self with 
the brain and, in her work Touching a Nerve. The Self as Brain she 
writes: « And who is I here if the self is just one of the things my brain 
builds, with a lot of help, as it turns out, from the brain’s unconscious 
activities?»
18
.    
In order to better understand which conception of man is being 
brought about by neurosciences, we think that it would be useful to 
further investigate the concept of reality which underlies the most rad-
ical form of reductionism.  
 
4. The limit of naturalistic and materialistic realism 
  
Attractive as they may appear, Libet’s experiments have been very 
much criticised and some conclusions have been judged as untenable 
by many scholars. In a recent “philosophy of science” interpretation of 
Libet’s results Radder and Meynen thus summarise their conclusions:  
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From our analyses in this article, we may conclude that the results of Libet’s 
study and more recent Libet-type experiments do not permit strong (in par-
ticular, causal) claims about the relation between neurological processes, 
conscious free will, and motor activity. Instead, these experiments are better 
characterized as “exploratory experiments” […]. We are claiming, therefore, 
not that the experiments do not contribute at all to the debate on neuroscience 
and free will, but rather that at present this contribution is still exploratory in-
stead of providing a convincing test for or against the existence of free will
19
. 
 
The crucial point concerns precisely consciousness: materialistic mon-
ism coincides essentially with the elimination of the subject and its 
mental states, including consciousness, and this is the reason why it is 
called eliminativism (or eliminative materialism). Now, it seems im-
portant to stress that the elimination of the subject cannot but lead to 
the absolutisation of the object. What are the consequences of this ab-
solutisation? And before answering this, let us aks: what is the nature 
of the object? 
Scientific thought itself does not provide a unique answer to this 
latter question. On the one hand, it uses to refer the word «object» to a 
reality that would be constituted in a purely physical-material form, 
completely autonomous and independent from the subject. On the oth-
er hand, however, the description of the object provided by the most 
recent scientific psychology, when it speaks of perception, allows us 
to interpret it as a «cognitive construct», so that the subject would play 
a fundamental role in constructing the object. 
This point is theoretically very much relevant and deserves careful 
attention. From a certain point of view, the object is assumed as objec-
tive, because it is thought as autonomous and self-sufficient. It is as-
sumed as that which exists independently from the subject and its per-
ceptual capacities. In other words, the objective seems to be consid-
ered independently of its relation to the subject and for this reason it is 
considered as the authentic reality, that reality which is in itself (in se) 
and for itself (per se). From another point of view, instead, the object 
is considered as a result of the processing of information contained in 
stimuli, so that it is not the cause of what we perceive, but the effect of 
our receptive and processing activity. In this sense, it is claimed that 
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the object is a cognitive construct and it is said that it has no objective 
value, but only an objectual value: the object is posited in its relation 
to the subject and cannot be thought outside this relation. 
According to this second hermeneutical hypothesis, common expe-
rience objects have an objectual value and, when they are shared by 
the great majority of people, this does not attest their objectivity, but 
only their inter-subjectivity, in the sense they are a by-product of re-
ceptive information processes of individuals who are endowed with a 
complete cognitive system. Then it would be a mistake to think that 
what is being shared is that which in itself is objective, as it is happens 
with naïve realism. On the contrary, one must think that which is 
shared, even though by the majority of people, is assumed as if it were 
objective, despite being nothing else than subjective, and thus, in this 
case, inter-subjective. 
Those who reject naïve realism maintain that the «as if» should 
never be forgotten. Actually, it is precisely the very same nature of the 
given, which is so precisely because it is given to a subject, who im-
poses that it be grasped in its intrinsic relational value. This means 
that the reality we are dealing with and we are speaking of is empiri-
cal, not metaphysical: that is, it does not transcend experience, but co-
incides with experience itself. 
The object is only relatively independent, since it is located within 
the relation that binds it constitutively and structurally to the subject. 
Thus, we maintain the following hypothesis: information contained in 
stimuli is that starting from which the object can be constructed and 
the properties of the latter become as such only after it has been con-
structed in the mind/brain of the subject. The relation that mind has 
with the physical environment, which is constituted by multiple forms 
of energy, is thus transformed into multiple relations to objects only 
thanks to the subject’s neurophysiological and cognitive processes.  
According to us, from naïve realism, we need to move towards a 
critical and sophisticated realism, according to which stimuli cannot 
be thought of as coming from the object, but from a reality that be-
comes an object only within the field of subjective perception, which 
is then the field of experience. 
Reaching this concept of the object means judging any reductionist 
perspective and materialistic monism unacceptable: the subject cannot 
be eliminated, not only because cognitive processes of higher order, 
such as categorisation and thought, imply consciousness, but also be-
10 
 
cause cognitive processes of lower order do not simply consist in un-
dergoing changes coming from external stimuli, but actively select 
and process information that is contained in them.  
  
5. Denying subjectivity 
 
Our aim is to answer the question that we asked before. We start by 
saying that naturalistic and materialistic realism represents a dogmatic 
metaphysical conception, completely alien to a reflexive and critical 
thought.  
Moreover, naturalistic realism by affirming that the only reality is 
physical and material, proclaim the most radical denial of the subject 
– if by subject one means will and consciousness – and of the reflex-
ive thought which is the ground of any theory and any conception that 
is formulated, including naturalistic and reductionist theories that 
would want to deny that reflexive thought. This denial is precisely 
what we intend to investigate now, for it can be considered as at the 
same time the preliminary assumption of the whole naturalistic con-
ception, but also as its most significant landing point.    
Our reflection can start with Schwitzgebel entry in the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy: 
 
Early introspective psychologists' theoretical discussions of the nature of in-
trospection were often framed in reaction to skepticism about the scientific 
viability of introspection, especially the concern that the introspective act in-
terferes with or destroys the mental state or process that is its target. The 
most influential formulation of this concern was Comte's:  
“But as for observing in the same way intellectual phenomena at the time of 
their actual presence, that is a manifest impossibility. The thinker cannot di-
vide himself into two, of whom one reasons whilst the other observes him 
reason. The organ observed and the organ observing being, in this case, iden-
tical, how could observation take place? This pretended psychological meth-
od is then radically null and void” (1830, using the translation of James 
1890/1981, 188)
20
. 
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<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/introspection/>. Comte’s citation is con-
tained in: A. Comte, Cours de philosophie positive, vol. 1, Paris, Bacheleier, Libraire pour les 
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The problem highlighted by Comte represents undoubtedly the fun-
damental problem of self-consciousness: those who interpret the prin-
ciple of identity in a formal sense, without grasping its intrinsic dy-
namics, identify a contradiction in the splitting of self-consciousness. 
To Comte’s objection, which has been accepted by many contempo-
rary scholars and researchers, we must oppose two considerations: the 
first concerns the principle of identity and the second gives value to 
the reflexive property of thought, which constitute the very ground of 
self-consciousness.  
With respect to the principle of identity, we can recall the definition 
provided by Aristotle: «sameness is a kind of oneness, either of the 
being of more than one thing or when a thing is treated as more than 
one (as for instance when someone says that a thing is the same as it-
self, which is to treat it as two things)»
21
.  
Thus, sameness expresses either that a thing is identical to another 
(A identical to B, A is B) or that a thing is identical to itself (A identi-
cal to A, A is A). In both cases, the fundamental point, which must be 
stressed, is the following: sameness is constituted as identity between 
two terms. This allows us highlighting that sameness is grounded on 
the relation or, in other words, relation is constitutive of identity. Oth-
erness (non-A), indeed, is required – even though it is required to be 
then denied – to let the substantial sameness of both terms emerge, 
despite, on a formal level, these terms are presented as distinct. 
This applies also when one affirms the sameness of a thing with it-
self. This sameness too is expressed by the formula «A is A», that is 
as a relation, ratified by the copula «is», and this relation is nothing 
but an identity because the first term coincides with the second one. 
Thus, if the two terms were not posited as two, one could conclude 
that they are the same, so that relation plays a vital role in the concept 
of sameness, which is intrinsically constituted by virtue of difference. 
Now, supporters of materialistic monism reject precisely the rela-
tional structure of identity, which is explicitly formalised in the Prin-
ciple of Contradiction (which affirms that a thing is identical with it-
self because it is not another thing) and Comte belongs pleno iure to 
this group of thinkers. Thus, materialistic monists do not acknowledge 
                                                          
21 Aristotle, Metaphysics, V, 9, 1018a, 7-9; Translated with Notes by Christopher Kirwan, 
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the dynamical character of identity and think that any determined 
identity (any «thing») is autonomous and self-sufficient. However, it 
is not so: indeed, any determined identity is posited thanks to a limit, 
which determines something (A) only to the extent that it refers it (A) 
to something else (non-A), so that, even from this point of view, it is 
evident that relation has a primary and foundational value. But rela-
tion does not fit within a rigidly monistic perspective, for it should 
postulate only a formal difference, given that the substance is unique. 
However, by maintaining the difference between form and substance, 
one cannot but reproduce another form of dualism.   
With respect to thought, moreover, reflexive property is the most 
authentic expression of an identity which is explicitly grounded on the 
difference: thought only can posit itself as an object of its own activi-
ty, i.e., it can reflect on itself, and this does not prove its contradictory 
nature, but its strength and richness.  
To better understand this, we can refer again to Schwitzgebel:  
 
Introspective psychologists tended to react to this concern in one of three 
ways. The most concessive approach—recommended, for example, by James 
(1890/1981; see also Mill 1865/1961; Lyons 1986)—was to grant Comte's 
point for concurrent introspection, that is, introspection simultaneous with the 
target state or process, and to emphasize in contrast immediate retrospection, 
that is, reflecting on or attending to the target process (usually a conscious 
experience) very shortly after it occurs. Since the scientific observation oc-
curs only after the target process is complete, it does not interfere with that 
process; but of course the delay between the process and the observation 
must be as brief as possible to ensure that the process is accurately remem-
bered
22
. 
 
This position has become an irrevocable assumption of the naturalistic 
perspective: awareness can only be referred to past psychical states, so 
that we can never be aware of the present. Nonetheless, we ask: can 
we have a past without a present? Moreover: if that which appears to 
consciousness as present, in fact is only past, does the awareness of 
this belong to the present or the past? This leads to the following ques-
tion: can we affirm something by forgetting the very essence of ad-
firmare (to affirm), that is, «holding firm»? If that which I affirm is 
only the past of my psychical states, even this present claim – i.e., the 
claim that we hold firm only past states – belongs to the past and, thus, 
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we can think of a present that denies it and which will become clear to 
me only in the future, when again it will appear as memory (of past 
states).      
We are thus in a status in which we remember, but without know-
ing that we are remembering and without knowing what it means re-
membering; on the contrary we are mistaking knowing with remem-
bering. In this way, what we are missing is precisely the knowing and 
the foundational role that it plays, since what I affirm is nothing but 
what I believe that I know «at the present». 
This theme is explicitly discussed by Dennett, when he criticises 
the «Cartesian Theater, a place where ‘It all comes together’ and con-
sciousness happens»
23
. We cannot speak any longer of a conscious 
self, according to Dennett, but only of a narrative in which the self is 
resolved: «Just what we are conscious of within any particular time 
duration is not defined independently of the probes we use to precipi-
tate a narrative about that period. […] But any narrative (or narrative 
fragment) that does get precipitated provides a "time line," a subjec-
tive sequence of events from the point of view of an observer, that 
may then be compared with other time lines, in particular with the ob-
jective sequence of events occurring in the brain of that observer»
24
. 
Thus, Dennett opposes a «subjective or narrative sequence»
25
 to an 
«objective sequence», which is constituted by brain states. But he for-
gets that the claim of objective sequence, precisely as a claim, is part 
of a narrative, so that it cannot have any objective value. It is only by 
forgetting this that he can reach the following conclusion:   
 
A self, according to my theory, is not any old mathematical point, but an ab-
straction defined by the myriads of attributions and interpretations (including 
self-attributions and self-interpretations) that have composed the biography 
of the living body whose Center of Narrative Gravity it is. […] And where is 
the thing your self-representation is about? It is wherever you are. And what 
is this thing? It's nothing more than, and nothing less than, your center of nar-
rative gravity
26
.  
 
Therefore, the self is resolved in the narrative, it is one of the ob-
jects of this same narrative, and for this reason it is objectified by 
                                                          
23 D.C. Dennett, Consciousness explained, p. 39. 
24 Ibid., p. 136. 
25 Ibidem. 
26 Ibid., pp. 426-429. 
14 
 
Dennett. But we can ask: can we have a narrative without someone 
who narrates? Furthermore: can we have a self in its objectified form, 
i.e., as a «center of gravity», without an I who is objectifying this self?  
We can add that Dennett presupposes a centre of narrative gravity 
which, however, not only ignores to be such, but also does not know 
what a narrative is. Therefore, the narrative he is speaking of is com-
pletely mechanical and unconscious. Who can then say that we are 
dealing with a narrative? The claim that it is a narrative requires a sub-
ject that, by knowing himself, also knows what effectively is that 
which he does and, thus, what a true narrative is. In conclusion, Den-
nett’s claim is a true claim if, and only if, Dennett is an authentic sub-
ject.  
Objectification, which is the same as narrative, cannot but require 
an objectifying condition, that is a condition that, on the one hand, al-
lows positing the objectification; and, on the other hand, allows this 
only because it emerges beyond the same objectification. If, indeed, 
the objectifying condition would be objectified itself, then it would 
cease being as objectifying. 
 We think that this represents the central issue: reflexive thought is 
the foundation of any claim and the possibility of exercising a critique 
rests essentially on a self-critique, that is on the power, which is typi-
cal of reflexive thought, of splitting itself in an objectifying and an ob-
jectified thought. This is precisely that which, instead, Comte meant to 
deny.  
 More generally, we could say that the inadequate attention devoted 
to reflexive thought by scientific thought is related to the pretence of 
reducing thought to a procedure, for procedures can only be described 
as a sequence of states, that can be analysed and represented.  
The act of thinking – that Plato and Aristotle called as noesis or 
nous, as something different from dianoia (which is indeed procedural 
thought) – is considered as foreign to the scientific conception, since it 
cannot be objectified, thus it is not representable. Nonetheless, in re-
jecting the objectifying act one loses eo ipso the possibility of ground-
ing the series of that which is objectified (the series of conditioned), 
whatever the series or the narrative is that one is speaking of. 
 In fact, even if it is only admitted the existence of reflexive 
thought, this represents the most radical denial of any reductionism. 
The latter admits that knowledge is placed on only one level and cate-
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gorically excludes any meta-level, which, according to reductionists, 
should be reduced to the only admitted level.  
On the contrary, reflexive thought not only stays as a meta-
cognition, and for this reason it can be placed on a meta-level, but 
more radically it transcends that aspect, which is still mechanical and 
characterises the meta-cognitive level, as psychologists say. Thought 
is reflexive precisely because it questions its own being placed on a 
formal level, i.e. its own proceeding: not only its own starting and 
moving points, but also the rules that govern the procedures. And pro-
cedures are completely conditioned by assumptions and rules.   
 We have thus reached the crucial point: reductionism is character-
ised by a first reduction, wherefrom all other are derived: the reduc-
tion of the ground to the beginning.  What comes first in the order of a 
series (the primitive or initial) is assumed as the ground of the series 
itself (i.e. as a ground) and this seems to be a very serious conceptual 
error. 
 
6. Reducing the ground to the beginning 
  
One of the assumptions on which the naturalistic programme rests, as 
we saw, is the rejection of the inner spectator, that is, of introspection, 
that Dennett has defined as «Cartesian Theater». Marraffa clarifies 
this point very well when he refers to intentional states:  
 
The second problem concerns the mechanics of thinking over time. The folk 
psychological laws that govern intentional mental processes subsume causal 
interactions among intentional states preserving their semantic coherence. 
For example, reasoning (the mental process par excellence) is a causal se-
quence of intentional states that tends to preserve their semantic (rational, ep-
istemic) properties. But what if not an inner interpreter might be sensitive to 
such properties? Here RTM [Representational Theory of Mind] is at risk of 
the above-mentioned homunculus fallacy
27
.   
 
Now, the inner interpret means nothing else than a self-conscious 
subject. According to us, self-consciousness acts as an authentic 
ground precisely because it can break the regressus in indefinitum: it 
is only because the subject is self-conscious that it can be conscious of 
                                                          
27 M. Marraffa, «Setting the stage: Persons, minds and brains», in M. Marraffa, M. De Ca-
ro and F. Ferretti, Cartographies of the Mind. Philosophy and Psychology in Intersection, 
Dordrecht (The Netherlands), Springer, 2007, p. 10. 
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that which is other from it. Self-consciousness represents that causa 
sui which is required lest we move backwards infinitely in the search 
for causes. 
On the contrary, the naturalistic conception, at least in its most ex-
treme version, finds it unacceptable to turn to a self-conscious subject, 
and claims that it is the same self-conscious subject which determines 
the infinite regress, that is the problem of homunculus:  
 
First and foremost, the fundamental objection that Skinner had to the mental-
istic explanation in psychology, namely the homunculus fallacy, is a vital 
constraint on any serious mentalistic psychology. That is, a plausible theory 
of cognition must avoid the infinite regress triggered by the attempt to ex-
plain a cognitive capacity by tacitly positing an internal agent with that very 
capacity
28
. 
 
Thus, what is at stake here is the problem of explanation. Explaining 
means, in synthesis, binding an explicandum to an explanans, which 
allows explaining the explicandum. Explaining a phenomenon 
amounts to bringing it back (i.e. reducing it) to the cause that has pro-
duced it or the condition that has made it possible. 
 According to naturalists, if intelligence is to be explained, we can-
not assume it as the explicans: intelligence cannot explain itself. We 
think that this assumption has not been carefully pondered and too 
hastily it has been abandoned in favour of an explanation that derives 
intelligence from simple, non-intelligent, elements. This functional 
decomposition is clearly synthesised by Feser:  
 
Dennett’s reply to such an objection would seem to lie in his influential strat-
egy of homuncular decomposition. The idea is this. We can usefully regard 
our minds as comprised of a number of subsystems that perform various 
mental functions: visual processing, linguistic competence, and so on. Each 
subsystem can itself be metaphorically understood as a “homunculus”– a “lit-
tle man” who performs some particular task. But the functions performed by 
each of these homunculi can, like our own minds, be thought of as comprised 
of yet more basic functions performed by smaller subsystems; in other words, 
each of the homunculi comprising our own minds can be thought of as com-
prising smaller homunculi of its own. At the level of our minds as a whole, 
we are dealing with what we have reason to treat as systems possessing a 
very high degree of intentionality. But the homunculi that comprise our 
minds, precisely because they perform more specific, less comprehensive 
                                                          
28 Ibid., p. 6.  
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functions, possess a lower degree of intentionality; and by the same token, 
the smaller homunculi that comprise them possess even less intentionality. If 
we keep decomposing each level of homunculi into ever smaller levels, even-
tually we will come to a basic level of homunculi who, because they perform 
functions as simple as possible, have as little intentionality as possible. Think 
of these as extremely stupid homunculi – homunculi whose task is no more 
complicated than flipping a switch back and forth
29
. 
 
We are thus faced with the following alternative: aut the starting point 
(the explicans) is not all intelligent, and then it can’t explain intelli-
gence without presupposing it; aut it maintains a certain share of intel-
ligence, but then the homunculus has not yet been «dismissed». This 
type of explanation not only presumes to be able to explain intelli-
gence by means of unintelligent operations, but it also purports to ex-
plain consciousness by means of the unconscious and the complex by 
means of the simple: the structure of the argument is the same.  
However, according to us, we must distinguish between two levels 
of explanation. On the first level, we have the mechanistic explana-
tion, according to which temporal priority coincides with causal pri-
ority. The radically naturalistic conception can only accept this type of 
explanation. 
According to us instead we must acknowledge a further level, that 
pertaining to reasons, which can be assimilated to the Aristotelian 
formal causes. Now in some sense consciousness is a reason of the 
unconscious, that is it acts as its possibility condition (intelligibility), 
since only by virtue of consciousness it is possible to define something 
as unconscious: the unconscious in fact is detected by consciousness 
as something different from it. Here we are dealing with a logical pri-
ority, which expresses that a condition of intelligibility, rather than a 
temporal antecedent, is necessarily required. 
 The difference between cause and reason is the same as that be-
tween beginning and ground. The beginning of a series (of a system) 
of elements opens the series but being the first element of a series is 
inseparably tied to what follows and so it suffers the conditioning of 
that which is conditioned by it.  
It seems to temporally precede the series, but in fact it only exists if 
the series is already given. Without the series, it could not count as the 
beginning: indeed, it would be the beginning of what? In this case we 
                                                          
29 E. Feser, Philosophy of Mind, Oxford (UK), Oneworld Publications, 2006, pp. 191-192. 
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are thus really in a regressus in indefinitum which is the circle of pre-
supposition:  the series presupposes the beginning of it, but the latter 
presupposes the series (without which it would be the beginning of 
nothing, i.e. not a beginning at all), so on infinitely. That homunculus, 
which one wanted «to dismiss», comes back inevitably in.  
There is only one way to prevent this infinite regress: understand-
ing the ground in the sense that it grounds itself, and because of this, it 
grounds the whole series. This applies only to the act of conscious-
ness. However, we must add that grounding the series means grasping 
the limit of intelligibility of it, not its legitimation on the formal (fac-
tual) plan: the ground does not confer truth to that which is grounded 
but grasps the limit of the latter.   
In conclusion, according to us, we cannot do without the classical 
concept of ground, which we consider essential to legitimate a theory. 
Having dismissed this concept has led to a series of claims that have 
not solved the problem of ground but have only led to the illusion of 
doing without this concept.  
This theme is however inescapable, because if we maintain that it is 
non-intelligence that constitutes the genesis of intelligence, then we 
will have to ask ourselves if the passage from the non-intelligible to 
the intelligible is really intelligible. This means that one should devel-
op an intelligent theory on the origin of intelligence and only by virtue 
of this theory (i.e. by the force of reason) one would be able to main-
tain the causal (thus also temporal) primacy of non-intelligence. 
We must thus conclude that just like the unconscious finds in con-
sciousness the condition for its intelligibility (possibility), so non-
intelligence must be grounded on intelligence, since the latter 
acknowledges the former in its limit and characterises it as such. And 
it does not make sense to reduce the ground to the beginning, because 
in this way one is replicating again that vicious circle which one in-
tended to eliminate. 
This is why we can reaffirm that only consciousness (i.e. reflexive 
thought) amounts to an authentic ground, because knowing itself it 
can acquire knowledge of everything that is other from itself. Moreo-
ver, since reflexive thought is the emerging of the act of thought on its 
own objectified forms, it follows that any pretence to completely solve 
knowing in the simple empirical and factual consciousness, as natural-
ism purports to do, is unacceptable, given the necessity of a meta-level 
19   
 
on which an objectifying knowing – irreducible to objectified 
knowledge – can be placed.  
 
7. Concluding remarks 
 
The conception of man that has emerged from the last developments 
in the science of mind must attract the greatest attention. If the cogni-
tivist conception, in its manifold facets, tends to reduce mental func-
tions to computational operations, to algorithms, and thought itself is 
considered as a rule following procedure, losing its reflexive and criti-
cal value which is the ground of the very same constitution of con-
sciousness, neurosciences tend to reduce mental states to brain states. 
In the first case, one is dealing with functionalist monism, in the sec-
ond with biological or materialistic monism. 
Nonetheless, if materialistic monism does not want, through an act 
of knowing, to deny knowledge, it must accept first of all that matter 
objectify itself in order to know itself, thus making itself other from 
itself and denying monism; furthermore, for the same reason, it must 
acknowledge that the same matter is resolved in knowledge, which 
makes the object of knowledge only one of the terms of knowledge re-
lation.  
In this way, that human being – who had to be reduced to matter 
and brain – re-merges essentially as thought and consciousness, since 
knowledge is such only because it is the result of reflexive thought 
and known as knowledge. To synthesise, materialistic monism ends 
up denying itself at the very same time in which it proposes itself as a 
conception of man and reality. 
 Furthermore, through to the epoché that it applies to the principle 
of consciousness, materialistic monism runs the risk of applying the 
same epoché to the principle of responsibility as well. The conse-
quences of this authentic reform of anthropology are very serious on 
many levels, first of all at the level of individual behaviour, since no 
one will feel responsible for his own actions and will feel legitimated 
to undertake the most atrocious acts. To us this seems to be a very se-
rious attack to the man, his value and his dignity. 
 
Riassunto 
La naturalizzazione della mente e le neuroscienze sembrano proporre una 
nuova antropologia, giacché l’uomo viene sempre di più assimilato a un 
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automa e pensato nella sua continuità con l’animale. In questo lavoro 
vengono messi in luce alcuni dei punti qualificanti di questo programma di 
ricerca e vengono svolte riflessioni critiche su di essi, per approdare alla 
conclusione che il monismo materialistico non soltanto finisce per negare se 
stesso, nel proporsi come una concezione – dunque un sistema di idee – della 
realtà e dell’uomo, ma altresì, epochizzando il principio di coscienza, 
epochizza anche il principio di responsabilità, con conseguenze che possono 
essere nefaste sul piano antropologico. 
Parole chiave: Naturalizzazione, monismo materialistico, riduzionismo, 
coscienza, antropologia   
Abstract 
Naturalisation of mind and neurosciences seem to propose a new anthropol-
ogy, since man is identified more and more to an automaton and thought in 
continuation with the animal. In this article we highlight some of the defin-
ing characteristics of this research programme and we propose some theoret-
ical reflections on it, concluding that materialistic monism not only ends up  
being self-refuting, by presenting itself as a conception – thus as a system of 
ideas – of reality and of man, but also, by bracketing the principle of con-
sciousness, it abstracts also from the principle of responsibility, with poten-
tial ill-fated consequences at the anthropological level. 
 
Keywords: Naturalisation, materialistic monism, reductionism, conscious-
ness, anthropology 
 
